We consider a dynamic model in which shareholders delegate a manager, who observes private information about running and liquidation costs of the firm, to operate the firm.
Introduction
previous papers, including Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010), we show that only the high-cost firm's behavior changes from that of the symmetric information case. Although, as in the symmetric information case, the firm with more existing debt (scrap value) tends to proceed to default (liquidation), the shareholders' choice of default in the high-cost firm is encouraged by the information asymmetries. This is because the choice of default in the high-cost firm reduces the information rent to the manager of the low-cost firm. If this effect is stronger, the shareholders causes the high-cost firm to default even when the liquidation value is higher than the face value.
In another perspective, we argue that more existing debt, which tends to cause default rather than liquidation, can play a positive role in reducing the information rent to the manager and alleviating the loss due to the information asymmetries. This result is similar to that of Lambrecht and Myers (2008) . They showed that risky debt can mitigate manager-shareholder conflicts, although their model does not include the manager's private information but considers the shareholders' possibility of firing the manager and closing or managing the firm by themselves.
The default timing of the high-cost firm is accelerated due to the information asymmetries because the shareholders can decrease the information rent to the manager by accelerating default. This is contrary to the result in the previous papers, such as Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010) , showing that the high-cost firm's investment timing is delayed. However, the opposite result is straightforward because our model is not an investment timing model but a default timing model. Our result is also in line with the empirical evidence by Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) . Actually, they found that family firms are more likely than firms with diversified ownership to value firm survival and hence better protect the debt holders' interests.
More notably, the effects of the information asymmetries on liquidation are equivocal.
The liquidation timing is accelerated (delayed) when the information asymmetries in the running costs are larger (smaller) than those of the liquidation costs. Our results are contrasted with the monotonic results in the previous literature, such as Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010) . When the effect of the running costs is larger, the high-cost firm liquidates earlier than the low-cost firm to save the high running cost. We hereafter call this case negative liquidation, which can be related to a case of scrapping the firm. When the effect of the liquidation costs is larger, the low-cost firm liquidates earlier to gain the high liquidation value. We hereafter call this case positive liquidation, which can be related to a case of selling the firm. Our result suggests that the information asymmetries accelerate negative liquidation and delay positive liquidation.
The information asymmetries reduce the equity and firm values and increase the manager's value. The debt and total values may increase due to the information asymmetries.
Below, we explain how the debt holders can potentially take advantage of the managershareholder conflicts under asymmetric information. Due to the default timing accelerated by the contract, the debt holders take over the firm earlier than in the symmetric information case. The early-defaulted firm may have a higher value than the debt value in the symmetric information case. For example, the shareholders can choose default of the high-cost firm to save the information rent even when the liquidation value is higher than the face value of debt. In this case, the debt holders can take over the firm which has a higher value than the face value. This also means that the debt value of the high-cost firm can be higher than that of the low-cost firm. The results also suggest the possibility of counter-intuitive market reactions as follows: The debt value rises as the firm approaches default, and it jumps downward (upward) when the firm's type appears to be low-cost (high-cost). Our results can potentially account for excess returns of the vulture investors' strategy that they buy a large block of debt of a distressed firm and thereafter control the firm (e.g., Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) ).
Furthermore, we show several results in the comparative statics. Higher costs of the low-cost firm can increase the equity value. In the asymmetric information case, higher costs of the low-cost firm play a positive role in decreasing the manager's private information. When this positive effect dominates the direct and negative effect of the higher costs, the higher costs increase the equity value. A higher volatility tends to cause the wealth transfer from the debt holders and manager to the equity holders. The asset substitution between the equity holders and debt holders is consistent with the standard results (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). The asset substitution between the manager and equity holders is also found in Shibata (2009) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010) .
In the optimal capital structure, we find that the initial coupon of debt, leverage, and credit spread in the asymmetric information case are higher than those of the symmetric information case. This is because issuing more risky debt reduces the information rent to the manager. This result is consistent with Lambrecht and Myers (2008) , who argued that risky debt can mitigate manager-shareholder conflicts. Several empirical studies, including Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) and McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001) , showed the positive relation between the ownership dispersion and leverage. Our result is also related to the empirical evidence by John and Litov (2010) that firms with weaker governance tend to use more debt.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. As a benchmark, Section 2 presents the results in the symmetric information case. Section 3 shows the key results in the asymmetric information case. In Section 4, we discuss several implications regarding market reactions and the optimal capital structure as well as the comparative statics.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
Symmetric information

Setup
The symmetric information model builds on the seminal works of Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) . We consider a firm that is receiving EBIT (earnings before interests and taxes) X(t) − (w + w i ) at time t, where X(t) is a stochastic component and w + w i stands for the firm's running costs. We also suppose that the firm issued console debt with coupon C(≥ 0) and is paying the coupon C continuously. Following the standard real options literature, we assume that X(t) follows a geometric Brownian motion:
where B(t) denotes the standard Brownian motion defined in a probability space (Ω, F, P) and µ, σ(> 0) and x(> 0) are constants. We assume that the initial value, X(0) = x, is sufficiently large to exclude the firm's default or liquidation at time 0. A positive constant r denotes the interest rate, and for convergence we assume that r > µ.
The running costs consist of two components: a public component w(≥ 0) and a private component w i (≥ 0). The private component potentially takes on two types:
Low-cost firm) and w H (i = H: High-cost firm), which satisfies ∆w = w H − w L > 0. In liquidation (scrapping and/or selling the assets), the firm receives the value θ − θ i (≥ 0) depending on the type. 3 The component θ(≥ 0) is publicly observed, while the cost θ i (≥ 0) is privately observed. Assume that ∆θ = θ H − θ L ≥ 0. 4 We assume that the shareholders delegate a manager to run the firm until the default or liquidation time. 5 When default takes place, the former debt holders take over, own, operate, and liquidate the firm. 6
For simplicity, we consider neither delegation nor debt financing after the changes in the ownership. After default, the firm has no debt and receives EBIT (1 − α)(X(t) − w − w i ) until liquidation, where α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the contraction parameter introduced in Mella- Barral and Perraudin (1997) and also corresponds to the default costs in Leland (1994) and 3 For simplicity, this paper does not consider the possibility of partial liquidation, which is typically accompanied by debt renegotiation. For instance, Nishihara and Shibata (2016) examined the firm's optimal choice between full liquidation and partial liquidation with debt restructuring.
4 Following Shibata and Nishihara (2010) and Grenadier and Malenko (2011) , we assume the manager's private information on the firm's cost structure. The results are unchanged if we assume the manager's private information on the firm's profit structure. 5 In the real world, a manager who was chosen by the former shareholders, is usually replaced by the new owners. 6 To focus on the information asymmetries between the manager and shareholders, this paper does not consider debt renegotiation, which has been studied in Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) , Fan and Sundaresan (2000) , Shibata and Nishihara (2015a) , and Shibata and Nishihara (2015b) , among others. Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) . For the details of the default costs, see also Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian, and Thorburn (2008) . Following Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), we assume that the liquidation value θ − θ i is not changed by the transfers in the ownership.
Throughout the paper, we assume the manager, shareholders, and debt holders are all risk-neutral and observe all information except for the firm's type i, w i , and θ i . Before contracting, all agents know that the probability of drawing a low-cost type i = L equals P ∈ (0, 1). In this section, we consider a symmetric information case in which the manager and shareholders observe the realized type i, private costs w i , and θ i immediately after contracting, while in Section 3 we consider an asymmetric information case in which only the manager observes the realized type i as well as private costs w i and θ i immediately after contracting.
The symmetric (asymmetric) information case corresponds to a case without (with) separation of ownership and management (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). For instance, the symmetric information case can capture the behavior of family-owned-andmanaged firms and firms with concentrated equity holdings, while the asymmetric information case can capture the behavior of firms with diffuse equity holdings. In another perspective, the symmetric (asymmetric) information case can approximate firms that have a higher (lower) level of transparency and disclosure. Although Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009) showed the positive relation between ownership concentration and corporate opacity, they focused mainly on the information asymmetries between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders rather than the information asymmetries between managers and shareholders. Thus, throughout this paper, we relate the asymmetric information case to firms with more diversified ownership.
Following the standard literature (e.g., Leland (1994) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) ), we assume a positive corporate tax rate τ and no taxation to the debt holders to highlight the tax benefits of debt. Following Shibata and Nishihara (2010) , we also assume no taxation to the manager, but the results can be easily extended into the case with a positive tax rate to the manager.
Solutions
Because all agents observe the realized type i as well as private costs w i and θ i , our problem is essentially the same as that of Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) . In the first place, we solve the problem after the shareholders' default. At the default time, the former debt holders take over and run the firm. They can optimize the liquidation time of the firm. The firm value right after default becomes
for X(t) >x i , which is defined bŷ
where
. Note thatx i stands for the liquidation trigger which is determined by the former debt holders. The former debt holders run the firm until X(t) hits the liquidation triggerx i . On the other hand, for
, which means that the former debt holders liquidate immediately after they take over the firm.
At time 0, the shareholders offer the menu ( At time 0, the shareholders' problem of optimizing the contract is expressed as follows: 7
Throughout the paper, we use the superscript * for the optimum in the symmetric infor-
7 It is not meaningful to consider a contract that includes C because C = 0 maximizes the equity value. It
is not meaningful even if we consider a contract that includes C and maximizes the firm value. In this case, the firm can receive tax advantages without default costs and the firm value becomes infinity when we choose C = ∞ and x i = 0. In other words, our model, like in the standard literature such as Leland (1994) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) , presumes the ex-post conflicts between the equity holders and debt holders.
The maximization problems in (3) are that of Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) . When we fix at l i = 0, our problems also correspond to that of Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) .
Clearly, the optimal solution l * i is 1 if and only if C/r ≤ θ − θ i . As in Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) , we have the following solutions to problem (3) by the first order condition.
Proposition 1
Case (I-S): C/r < θ − θ H (Both types liquidate.)
The ex-post equity values are
The ex-post debt values are
Note that ex-ante equity and debt values are
, respectively. Also, note that the ex-post and ex-ante manager's values, denoted by M * i (x) (i = L, H) and M * (x), respectively, are equal to 0. As in the standard literature (e.g., Leland (1994) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) ), Proposition 1 entails the conflicts between the equity holders and debt holders, while it does not entail the conflicts between the manager and equity holders. Depending on whether the face value of debt, C/r, is higher than the liquidation value θ − θ i , we can classify the results into Cases (I-S), (II-S), and (III). These results are essentially the same as those of Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) . Proposition 1 leads to the straightforward result that the firm with more existing debt (liquidation value) tends to proceed to default (liquidation). In the liquidation case, i.e., C/r < θ − θ i , the debt value D * i (x) is equal to the face value C/r because the debt holders receive C/r at the liquidation time. In the default case, i.e., θ − θ i ≤ C/r, the ownership of the firm is transferred to the former debt holders at the default time, and they decide whether they continue to operate or immediately liquidate the firm. In this case, the debt value is less than C/r (see MellaBarral and Perraudin (1997) ). As will be shown by Proposition 4 in Section 3.2, in the asymmetric information case, the debt values can be higher than the face value C/r.
Asymmetric information
Setup
In this section, we consider the asymmetric information case in which only the manager observes the realized type i as well as private costs w i and θ i . The model adds the asymmetric information model by Grenadier and Wang (2005) to the symmetric information model in Section 2. The asymmetric information case is more likely to apply to firms that have more diversified ownership and/or a lower level of transparency and disclosure.
At time 0, the equity holders offer the menu (
where for the manager's report j, x j is the liquidation or default threshold, l j is the indicator function of liquidation, and s j is the severance pay on the liquidation or default timing. 8 The manager accepts the offer and starts running the firm if it satisfies the participation condition, which will be explained later. Immediately after taking over the firm, the manager observes the firm's type i and cost w i and reports the firm's type j and cost w j to the equity and debt holders. If l j = 1, the manager liquidates at the threshold x j . Only the manager observes the true liquidation cost θ i . If l j = 0, the manager stops paying the coupon C at the threshold x j . On the default timing, the manager is fired and the firm is taken over by the former debt holders.
The equity and debt holders cannot verify whether the manager's report j is equal to the real type i. 9 Thus, the manager may have incentive to falsely report j ̸ = i, receive 8 The assumption of the severance pay is not essential. Actually, the results are unchanged when we assume the payments to the manager at time 0 instead of the severance pay.
9 Unlike in our paper, Delaney and Thijssen (2015) examined the impact of the manager's voluntary disclosure w j − w i until the default or liquidation time, and receive l j (θ j − θ i ) and s j at the default or liquidation time. 10 However, we can easily check that the revelation principle holds.
Therefore, the shareholders can find the optimal menu (
within the menus that lead the manager to truthfully report j = i. Throughout the paper, we use the superscript * * for the optimum in the asymmetric information case.
Although the ex-ante commitment may lead to ex-post inefficiency in default and liquidation decisions, it increases the ex-ante equity value. When costs of renegotiation are lower than costs of the ex-post inefficiency, the manager and shareholders may renegotiate the contract and execute the first-best default and liquidation policy. 11 Alternatively, when costs of auditing the manager's false report is low and/or the penalty for the false report is strong (e.g., the manager is fired), the first-best default and liquidation policy in Section 2 can be executed under asymmetric information (for such auditing mechanisms, see Nishihara and Shibata (2008) , Shibata (2009) , and Shibata and Nishihara (2011)).
However, in order to focus how information asymmetries distort the default and liquidation decisions, we assume that no opportunity for renegotiation and audit exists. Our model approximate situations with high costs of renegotiation and audits. It should also be noted that management compensation tends to depend more on the firm's performance in a distressed firm than in an ordinary firm (e.g., Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian, and Thorburn (2008)).
Solutions
At time 0, the shareholders' problem is expressed as
on the firm's investment decision assuming that the manager's voluntary disclosure is creditable. 10 As in the standard contract theory, the terms ∆w and ∆θ can be interpreted not only as the manager's profits by outright frauds such as embezzlement and hiding property and assets on liquidation but also as some increases in the manager's utility. For instance, the manager may run and liquidate the firm with costs w H and θ H by putting less efforts into the low-cost firm than into the high-cost firm. 11 In general, the possibility of renegotiation greatly changes equilibrium results. For example, in a real option model of venture financing and investment, Lukas, Mölls, and Welling (2016) showed renegotiation between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist greatly changes the outcome. subject to the incentive compatibility conditions
and the ex-post participation conditions
Under condition (15), the manager who observes the low cost reports truthfully because the expected payoff with the truthful report, i.e., the left-hand side value of (15), is larger than the expected payoff with the false report, i.e., the right-hand side value of (15).
Note that the manager who falsely reports the high-cost type gains ∆θ if and only if the shareholder chooses default of the high-cost firm, i.e., l H = 1. Similarly, condition (16) ensures that the manager who observes the high-cost reports truthfully. Note that the objective function (14) is equal to (2) minus the severance pay. The ex-ante participation condition follows from (17) and (18).
We can remove (17) because it is always satisfied under (15) and (18). We can readily
show that in optimum, s * * H = 0, which means the manager's value M * * H (x) is equal to 0 in the high-cost firm. In addition, we can easily see that the problem with (l L , l H ) = (0, 1) is dominated by the problem with (l L , l H ) = (1, 1) for C/r ≤ θ H and dominated by the problem with (l L , l H ) = (0, 0) for C/r > θ H . Thus, we need to solve the three remaining cases and compare the maximal values. In the following proposition, Cases (I), (II), and (III) correspond to (l * * L , l * * H ) = (1, 1), (1, 0), and (0, 0), respectively. Note that in optimum, the equality holds in (15). For the proof, refer to Appendix A.
The ex-post manager's value is
Note that ex-ante equity, debt, and manager's values are
, respectively. As in Proposition 1, we classified the results into three cases, and we have the straightforward result that the firm with more existing debt (liquidation value) tends to proceed to default (liquidation).
A most notable result is that the threshold between Cases (I) and (II) is lower than the threshold between Cases (I-S) and (II-S) in Proposition 1 by ∆θP/(1 − P ). To be more precise, for θ − θ H − ∆θP/(1 − P ) ≤ C/r < θ − θ H , the high-cost firm's strategy is default under asymmetric information, while it is liquidation under symmetric information (see Table 1 ). This means that in the asymmetric information case, the high-cost firm can default even if the liquidation value θ − θ H is higher than the face value of debt, C/r. The intuition is as follows. The manager's private information consists of two components: ∆w for the running costs and ∆θ for the liquidation costs. In Case (I), the shareholders pay the information rent for both ∆w and ∆θ to the low-cost firm's manager, while in Case (II) or (III), the shareholders pay the information rent only for ∆w. In Case (II) or (III), the shareholders can save the information rent for ∆θ because the manager of the low-cost firm cannot gain ∆θ by feigning the high-cost type. For θ − θ H − ∆θP/(1 − P ) ≤ C/r < θ − θ H , the effect of saving the information rent by choosing default of the high-cost firm dominates the direct gain θ − θ H − C/r by choosing liquidation of the high-cost firm. This is why under asymmetric information the shareholders can choose default even when θ − θ H is higher than C/r. Now, we look at Proposition 2 from the viewpoint of existing debt C/r. In Case (I), the manager's value M * * L (x) (see (23)) is independent of C/r because x * * H (see (19)) is independent of C/r. When C/r increases to θ − θ H − ∆θP/(1 − P ), M * * L (x) jumps downward to (29) from (23) because the information rent ∆θ disappears at this point.
From this point, M * * L (x) (see (29)) monotonically decreases with C/r because x * * H (see (24)) monotonically increases with C/r. Thus, we argue that more existing debt can play a role in alleviating the asymmetric information problem and decreasing the manager's value. In other words, a debt financing constraint can worsen the manager-shareholder conflicts. Our result is similar to the finding of Lambrecht and Myers (2008) . They showed that risky debt can mitigate manager-shareholder conflicts, although their model does not include the manager's private information but considers the shareholders' possibility of firing the manager and closing or managing the firm by themselves. A similar result is also found in Lambrecht and Myers (2012) . We will turn back to this argument in the analysis of the optimal capital structure in Section 4.3.
In this paper, we consider the severance pay s j on the liquidation or default timing, but we have other types of compensation schemes, which achieve the same maximum for the equity holders. 12 In the following corollary, we present the compensation that does not depend on the initial state variable x.
Corollary 1
The following compensation scheme achieves the same results as in Proposition 2.
H ≥ x * L , the shareholders continuously pay ∆w until X(t) ≥ x * * H and pay the severance pay (x * L /x * * H ) γ ∆θ at x * L to the the low-cost firm's manager. Otherwise, the shareholders continuously pay ∆w until X(t) ≥ x * L and pay the severance pay ∆w
H ≥ x * L , the shareholders continuously pay ∆w until X(t) ≥ x * * H to the low-cost firm's manager. Otherwise, the shareholders continuously pay ∆w until X(t) ≥ x * L and pay the severance pay ∆w/r − (x * L /x * * H ) γ ∆w/r at x * L to the low-cost firm's manager.
In the compensation scheme of Corollary 1, the equity holders pay w + w L + ∆w, which is exactly equal to the payment w + w H to the high-cost firm's manager, to the lowcost firm's manager until X(t) hits max(x * L , x * * H ). Thus, we can implement this optimal contract by assuming that the manager reports the firm's type at the default or liquidation time rather than at the initial time. In this case, until X(t) > max(x * L , x * * H ), the equity and debt holders cannot observe the firm's type, and hence the equity and debt values remain the ex-ante values E * * (x) and D * * (x), respectively. In Section 4.1, we will relate 12 We cannot increase the equity value beyond E * * (x) of Proposition 2 because there are only two types i = L and H.
this situation to equity and debt market reactions.
As to the default and liquidation thresholds, we can show the following proposition.
For the proof, see Appendix B.
Proposition 3
The default and liquidation thresholds satisfy the following relation.
Cases (I-S) and (II) :
The liquidation and default timing of the low-cost firm is not changed by the information asymmetries. The default timing of the high-cost firm is always earlier in the asymmetric information case than in the symmetric information case. 13 This is because the shareholders can decrease the incentive for the low-cost firm's manager to feign the high cost by increasing the default threshold x * * H beyond x * H . The logic behind our result is the same as that of the previous papers, such as Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010) . They showed that the high-cost firm's investment time is delayed due to the information asymmetries. However, we have the opposite result that the high-cost firm's default time is accelerated by the information asymmetries because we consider not investment timing but default timing.
On the other hand, in Case (I), the high-cost firm's liquidation timing can be earlier or later in the asymmetric information case than in the symmetric information case. The sensitivity depends on whether the information asymmetries about running costs, ∆w/r, are larger than those of liquidation costs, ∆θ. An increase in the liquidation threshold x * * H decreases the information rent for ∆w/r but increases the information rent for ∆θ. For ∆θ < ∆w/r, the shareholders increase x * * H beyond x * H because the former effect is stronger than the latter. In this case, the high-cost firm liquidates earlier than the lowcost firm, and, hence, liquidation is regarded as negative due to the high running cost. For instance, negative liquidation may occur in the case of scrapping a firm piecemeal. Our result suggests that the information asymmetries accelerate negative liquidation. On the other hand, for ∆θ > ∆w/r, the shareholders decrease x * * H below x * H because the latter effect is stronger than the former. In this case, the low-cost firm liquidates earlier than the high-cost firm, and, hence, liquidation is regarded as the positive consequence of the high liquidation value. For instance, positive liquidation may occur in the case of selling a firm as a going concern. Our result suggests that the information asymmetries delay positive liquidation.
For ∆θ < ∆w/r or ∆θ > ∆w/r, the shareholders succeed in reducing the information rent to the manager by adjusting the liquidation trigger x * * H . However, for ∆θ = ∆w/r, the shareholders cannot decrease the information rent by adjusting x * * H . Thus, the liquidation timing remains unchanged from that of the symmetric information case. Our equivocal results about the liquidation timing are contrasted with the monotonic results in the previous literature, including Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010) . The novel result stems from the fact that our model, unlike those in the previous literature, includes two different types of private information, ∆w and ∆θ.
Except for Case (II), the distance between x * * H and x * * L = x * L is larger than the distance between x * H and x * L . This property is the same as in the existing literature such as Grenadier and Wang (2005) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010) . However, in Case (II), the distance between x * * H and x * * L = x * L can be smaller than the distance between x * H and x * L . The reason is that in Case (II), x * * H is the default threshold in the asymmetric information case, while x * * L = x * L is the liquidation threshold. 14 Thus, we have ambiguous results, which are different from the previous findings.
To summarize, we have the following empirical predictions: Firms with more diversified ownership and/or a lower level of transparency and disclosure tend to default earlier.
Firms with more diversified ownership and/or a lower level of transparency and disclo-14 x * * H can be either the default or liquidation threshold sure tend to do negative (positive) liquidation earlier (later). Our result regarding the default timing aligns with the empirical evidence in Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) .
They showed that firms with family ownership are more likely than firms with diversified ownership to value firm survival and hence better protect the debt holders' interests.
We now turn to the values. We define the firm value, denoted by F (x), and total value, denoted by T V (x), as the sum of the equity and debt values and the sum of the equity, debt, and manager's values, respectively. Clearly, we have F * i (x) = T V * i (x) (i = L, H) and F * (x) = T V * (x) in the symmetric information case. On the other hand, by Proposition 2
) in the asymmetric information case. As to the equity, debt, firm, manager's, and total values, we have the following proposition. See Appendix C for the proof.
Proposition 4
In all cases, the equity, manager's, and total values satisfy the following equations: 15
When A H (x * * H ) > C/r, the debt values satisfy
The relations of the equity values are straightforward. The equity value in the symmetric information case is not lower than that of the asymmetric information case, and the ex-post equity value in the low-cost firm is not lower than that of the high-cost firm. In Case (I), the debt and firm values also follow the straightforward relation. As to the total 15 The relations (e.g., the relation between T V * * (x) and T V * (x)) other than described in Proposition 4 depend on the parameter values.
value, the ex-post total value of the low-cost firm in the asymmetric information case is higher than that of the symmetric information case because the payment to the manager, like the coupon payment to the debt holders, generates the tax advantage. Accordingly, the ex-ante total value in the asymmetric information case can be higher than that of the symmetric information case.
The More notably, however, the debt and firm values in Case (II) or (III) may deviate from the straightforward relations for some parameter values (especially for a high P ).
Especially for A H (x * * H ) > C/r, we have (32), which means that the information asymmetries increase the ex-post debt value of the high-cost firm beyond the face value of debt, C/r. Thus, the debt value in the asymmetric information case is higher than that of the symmetric information case, and the ex-post debt value of the high-cost firm is higher than that of the low-cost firm. 16
This counter-intuitive results can happen in the following two situations. One situation is where Cases (I-S) and (II) are both satisfied, i.e., θ −θ H −∆θP/(1−P ) ≤ C/r < θ −θ H . As explained after Proposition 2, in the high-cost firm the shareholders choose default and decrease the information rent to the low-cost firm's manager though the liquidation value θ−θ H is higher than C/r. Then, the debt holders take over the firm that has a higher value than C/r. The counter-intuitive result can happen even if C/r ≥ θ − θ H . As explained after Proposition 3, the shareholders increase the default threshold x * * H of the high-cost firm to decrease the information rent. When x * * H is sufficiently large, the firm which the debt holders take over can generate a lot of profits until X(t) hits the liquidation trigger
H ) > C/r can be satisfied in this situation. Thus, in the high-cost firm, the debt holders can take advantage of the managershareholder conflicts under asymmetric information. Our result suggests the possibility that debt holders can benefit from more diversified ownership and a lower level of transparency and disclosure. Relatedly, Shibata and Nishihara (2010) also showed that the information asymmetries can increase the debt value of the high-cost firm. In their model, 16 In this case, with respect to the firm values, we may also have F * *
the information asymmetry about the investment costs increases the investment threshold and then increases the optimal coupon at the investment time. They argue that because of the increased coupon, the debt value can be higher than that of the symmetric information case. However, their model does not lead to a distortion in the default time and debt value from that of Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) because they do not consider any information asymmetry after investment. Unlike in Shibata and Nishihara (2010) , our model, which focuses on the information asymmetries about running and liquidation costs of the distressed firm with a fixed coupon, can explain how the information asymmetries distort the default time and debt value.
Further analysis
Jumps in equity and debt values
In this section, we assume that following the contract in Corollary 1 investors do not observe the firm's type until X(t) hits max(x * L , x * * H ). Investors evaluate the equity and debt prices by the ex-ante values E * * (X(t)) and D * * (X(t)), respectively, until
At the trigger, they observe the realized type i and change the valuations to the ex-post values
. Clearly, the uninformed equity price E * * (X(t)) decreases as X(t) decreases to max(x * L , x * * H ). At that point, as proved in Proposition 4, the equity value jumps upward to E * *
) when the firm type is low-cost (high-cost). On the other hand, according to Proposition 4, in Case (II) or (III) the debt price can jump downward (upward) when the firm type is low-cost (high-cost). In addition, the uninformed debt price D * * (x) can increase as X(t) decreases to max(x * L , x * * H ). Figure 1 shows the three types of results about the debt values. The parameter values are set at Table 2 17 except for P and C. In the top panel, D * * (x) increases as X(t) decreases to the trigger x * * H , and at the point, the debt value jumps downward (upward) when the firm type is low-cost (high-cost). According to our computations, this counter-intuitive result can occur in Case (II) or (III) with a high P and a low C. In the middle panel, D * * (x) straightforwardly decreases as X(t) decreases to the trigger x * * H , and at that point, the debt value jumps downward (upward) when the firm type is low-cost (high-cost). We also find that this result can occur in Case (II) or (III) for a high P and a low or medium C.
The bottom panel shows the straightforward result: D * * (x) decreases as X(t) decreases to the trigger x * * H , and at that point, the debt value jumps upward (downward) when the firm type is low-cost (high-cost). We tend to have this straightforward result for most of the parameter values.
Our results can potentially account for a lot of types of excess returns of distressed firms. In particular, the results are closely associated with the following strategy of vulture investors. Typically, vulture investors purchase a large block of debt of a distressed firm and attempt to control the firm as large shareholders after bankruptcy (e.g., Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) ). We can explain excess returns of the vulture investors' strategy not only when the firm type results in low-cost (cf. the bottom panel of Figure 1 ) but also when the firm type results in high-cost (cf. the top and middle panels of Figure 1 ).
Comparative statics
In this section, we explain several comparative statics results. We focus mainly on counterintuitive and non-monotonic results. First, we can analytically show the non-monotonic impact of the costs of the low-cost firm, w L and θ L , on the equity and firm values E * * (x) and F * * (x) in Case (I). For the proof, see Appendix D.
In the symmetric information case, we have the monotonic relation
while in the asymmetric information case, we have the non-monotonic relation
In Proposition 5, in the presence of information asymmetries, higher w L and θ L have non-monotonic effects on E * * (x), while in the absence of information asymmetry, higher w L and θ L monotonically decrease E * (x). In Case (I), the firm values follow the same sensitivities as those of the equity values because the firm value is the sum of the equity value and C/r. In the asymmetric information case, higher w L and θ L can play a positive role in decreasing the manager's private information ∆w and ∆θ, respectively. When
, this indirect and positive effect dominates the direct and negative effect and improves the equity value. If ∆w = r∆θ, the ex-ante equity value E * * (x) is exactly equal to the worst-case value E * * H (x) because of x * L = x * * H . This implies that there is no efficient compensation to resolve the information asymmetries. It is worth noting that higher w H and θ H monotonically decrease E * * (x) and F * * (x) because they increase ∆w and ∆θ, respectively. We numerically found similar non-monotonic impacts of w L and θ L on E * * (x), D * * (x), and F * * (x) in Case (II) or (III) with a low C, although we cannot analytically prove the non-monotonic sensitivities. As to the total value, we also numerically found that T V * * (x) monotonically decreases with w L and θ L .
We also examine the comparative statics with respect to σ although we cannot analytically prove the results. Figures 2 and 3 show the comparative statics with respect to a volatility σ. We present the results in Case (III). We see from Figure 2 In summary, we argue that a higher σ causes the wealth transfer from the manager (and the debt holders) to the equity holders (when debt is risky). The asset substitution between the shareholders and manager is also consistent with previous findings in Shibata (2009) and Shibata and Nishihara (2010) . The asset substitution between the equity holders and debt holders is consistent with the standard results (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976) ).
Optimal capital structure
So far, we have examined the problem with an initial coupon C fixed. In this subsection, we explore the optimal capital structure case, where C is chosen so as to maximize the ex-ante firm value. Table 3 shows the results, where the parameter values are set at Table by "Sym." and "Asym." in Table 3 , respectively, we also present the case "Asym-TV." in which C is chosen so as to maximize the ex-ante total value. In every case, we obtained an inverted U -shaped function of C and found that the optimal C is high enough to lead to Case (III).
In Table 3 , the coupon, leverage (denoted by LV ), and credit spread (denoted by CS), in the asymmetric information case are higher than those of the symmetric information case. This is because the shareholders decrease the information rent M * * L (x) to the manager by increasing C and LV . For a high θ − θ i , the optimal C can lead to Case (I) or (II).
The results remain unchanged when the optimal C leads to Case (II). As was discussed after Proposition 2, M * * L (x) (see (29) and (24)) decreases with C in Case (II) or (III). Thus, the shareholders can decrease the information rent to the manager by increasing C and LV . In some cases, in the symmetric information case, the optimal C leads to Case (I-S), whereas in the asymmetric information case, the optimal C leads to Case (II) or (III). In these cases, the differences in C, LV , and CS between the symmetric and asymmetric cases become larger.
On the other hand, the results regarding C, LV , and CS change from Table 3 when the optimal C leads to Case (I), i.e., the risk-less debt case. Actually, in this case, the optimal C agrees with the threshold between Cases (I) and (II) (Cases (I-S) and (II-S)) in the asymmetric (symmetric) information case. The difference arises mainly because in Case (I), debt is risk-less and the shareholders cannot decrease M * * L (x) (see (23) and (19)) by increasing C and LV .
In summary, we argue that the shareholders can reduce the loss due to the information asymmetries by increasing risky debt, leverage, and credit spread. This result aligns with Lambrecht and Myers (2008) and Lambrecht and Myers (2012) , who argued that risky debt can potentially mitigate manager-shareholder conflicts, although their model does not include the information asymmetries. As a testable prediction, our result suggests that a firm, that has more diffuse equity holdings as well as a lower level of transparency and disclosure, tends to have a higher leverage ratio. Although there have been ambiguous results about the relation between ownership and leverage (e.g., , King and Santor (2008) ), several papers, such as Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) and McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001) , empirically support our results. Actually, they found that ownership dispersion is positively related to leverage. Our result is also consistent with the empirical evidence by John and Litov (2010) that firms with weaker governance use more debt.
Lastly, we note that the key results tend to remain unchanged from Propositions 3 and 4 even when we compare the results in the symmetric and asymmetric information cases for the optimal C instead of a fixed C. Indeed, we can see the following results in Table 3 . The information asymmetries accelerate the default timing. The information asymmetries decrease the equity and firm values, while they can increase the debt value.
We also have an equivocal result in the liquidation timing when the optimal C leads to Case (I) or (II), although we omit a numerical example.
Conclusion
We examined the default and liquidation timing of a firm in which the shareholders delegate the manager, who observes private information about running and liquidation costs of the firm, to operate the firm. We analytically derived the shareholders' optimal contract, which consists of the default or liquidation timing and compensation contingent on the firm's cost structure. The main results in the asymmetric information case are summarized as follows.
As in the symmetric information case, the firm with more existing debt (liquidation value) tends to proceed to default (liquidation). However, unlike in the symmetric information case, the shareholders can choose default of the high-cost firm and reduce the compensation to the manager even when the liquidation value is higher than the face value of debt. More existing debt decreases the compensation to the manager and alleviates the loss due to the information asymmetries.
Although the information asymmetries do not change the low-cost firm's default and liquidation timing, they change the high-cost firm's default and liquidation timing. Indeed, they accelerate (delay) negative (positive) liquidation, while they accelerate default. In particular, our result regarding the default timing aligns with the empirical evidence regarding family firms.
While the information asymmetries straightforwardly decrease the equity and firm values, they may increase the debt value. In other words, the debt holders can take advantage of the manager-shareholder conflicts. In terms of market reactions, our model can generate a variety of jumps in the equity and debt values. In particular, our results can potentially explain excess returns of the vulture investors, who target distressed firms.
We also show several comparative statics results. Higher costs of the low-cost firm can play a positive role in decreasing the manager's private information. A higher volatility causes wealth transfer from the debt holders and manager to the equity holders. In the optimal capital structure, the initial coupon of debt, leverage, and credit spread in the asymmetric information case are higher than those of the symmetric information case. This is because an increase in risky debt decreases the loss due to the information asymmetries. Our results are consistent with empirical findings of the positive relation between the ownership dispersion and firm leverage.
A Proof of Proposition 2
We solve the problem (14) subject only to (15) and show that the solution satisfies (16).
In the optimal solution, we have s * * H = 0 and (15) is binding because otherwise we can increase the objective value by decreasing s H and/or s L . Below, we will solve the following problem:
The problem (33) By substituting (34) into the objective function (33), the problem (33) can be reduced to
where by the first order condition x * L and x * * H are derived as (4) and (19), respectively. The optimal servant pay s * * L is derived by (34). Then, we have (
In the same fashion as above, we have max
where by the first order condition, x * L and x * * H are derived as (4) and (24) 
Next, we compare the objective values in the solutions above. Clearly, the objective
By comparing the objective functions in (35) and (36), we have the objective value with
Then, we have the optimal solutions (l * * L , l * * H ) = (1, 1), (1, 0), and (0, 0) in Cases (I), (II), and (III), respectively.
Finally, we need to check that the solutions satisfy (16). Using (34), we have
We can show this inequality because using (19), we have
If ∆w/r − ∆θ ≤ 0, we immediately obtain this inequality. Otherwise, we can show this inequality because using (24), we have
where in (39) and (41) we used ∆w/r > ∆θ and in (40) we used θ
Note that
By (24) we can show this inequality as follows:
It is straightforward to obtain the equity, debt, and manager's values in each case.
The proof is completed.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Note that Case (I) is included in Case (I-S). Then, we can immediately show the relations by comparing (4), (5), and (19).
and
Using (42) and (43), we can show the relations in Case (II).
We can immediately show the relations by comparing (11), (8), and (24).
C Proof of Proposition 4
Equity values.
By Proposition 2, we can immediately show that 
Manager's values.
The relation immediately follows from Proposition 2.
Debt, firm and total values.
By Proposition 2, we immediately get (30). Thus, the firm values satisfy the same relations as those of the equity values. We can easily show the relations of the total
It is easy to check (31) in general. Using (31) and the relation between the equity values, we have
. Lastly, we will show that F * * H (x) < F * H (x) below. Note that if we have F * * H (x) < F * H (x), F * * (x) < F * (x) and T V * * H (x) < T V * H (x) immediately follow.
-Case (II-S) or (III): θ − θ H ≤ C/r
We define f (y) by
byỹ
D Proof of Proposition 5
In Case (I), we have F * (x) = E * (x) + C/r and F * * (x) = E * * (x) + C/r. Then, we have only to show the results of E * (x) and E * * (x). In the symmetric information case, we have
By (51) and the envelope theorem, we have
On the other hand, in the asymmetric information case, we have
By (52) and the envelope theorem, we have
Then, the results follows from Proposition 3. Table 1 : Differences between the symmetric and asymmetric information cases. Figure 1 : Jumps in the debt value. We set P = 0.9. In the top, middle, bottom panels, C are set at 0.1, 0.5, and 1, respectively. The other parameter values are set at Table 2 . Table 2 . The left-hand and right-hand panels show the results in the symmetric and asymmetric information cases, respectively. Note that in the symmetric information case we omit the total values, which are exactly equal to the firm values.
